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REPETITION OF A WORD AS A MEANS OF SUSPENSE IN THE GERMAN DRAMA UNDER THE INFLU- ENCE OF ROMANTICISM

I. GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN REPETITION AND ARTISTIC COMPOSITION

The repetition of some part or parts organically related to the fundamental idea of any work of art, literary, musical, or pictorial, is both an essential part of artistic structure and an effective means of intensification of utterance. The parts repeated may be any units of expression: in poetry, a word, a phrase, a sound, a stress, a vowel or consonant, or groups and concretions of these; in music, a tone or a group of tones, a theme, or a musical phrase; in pictorial art, a line or a general direction of lines, a color or a combination of colors, spots or masses of color, or of light and shade. They may even be whole sections, as the burdens of ballads, the various restatements of the theme in symphonic composition, especially in the symphony and sonata, or the return to the first part in Chopin's *Nocturnes*, and all the frequent repeats in musical composition; in architecture, all the structural duplications designated by the term "symmetry;" and in the drama they may be, under certain circumstances, whole situations and scenes—with modifications—as Herod's return in Hebbel's *Herodes und Mariamne*.

The function of repetition as a necessary part of artistic structure is chiefly amplification. In order to give richness and diversity, depth and breadth, to the main idea of a work of art, it is necessary that this idea be presented in a variety of relations; which means that it must be repeated in many different surroundings. In every symphonic composition the various themes are repeated in a constantly changing harmonic environment. Without this repetition musical composition would be impossible. The same is true of pictorial art, as any good Japanese print, or any fragment from the frieze of the Parthenon, or any example of great art that has weathered the criticism of history will show.

The other function of repetition, that of intensification, is derived from the emotional effect of the reiterated impact of the same perception upon our consciousness preoccupied with the train of associations induced by the general idea of some work of art. If the repetition is sufficiently regular to be anticipated and calculated, it takes the form of symmetry, rhyme, or rhythm, the latter including not only poetic rhythm, but the form of repetition called rhythm of lines, colors, tones, curves, masses, and movement in the pictorial and dramatic arts and architecture. The repeated parts may be separated by others, or they may be reiterated in uninterrupted succession. Beethoven frequently doubles and again doubles the ratio of the repetition of a note; others—Chopin and Liszt, for instance—increase the ratio of repetition less regularly. Liszt uses the repetition of a note in a very characteristic and effective manner, in his piano concertos and rhapsodies, to produce the effect of an echo-like reverberation.

Numerous as are these cases in which intensification is due to regularity of repetition, they are yet easily classified under what is properly termed the general technique of each art. Far more complicated are the cases in which intensification is the result of the opposite condition. The spectator may be startled into intense anticipation by the unexpectedness, or by the length or brevity, of the intervals separating the recurrences of the part repeated. Or, repetition may, by a gradual unemphatic cumulation of emotional effects, produce an all-pervading emotional atmosphere, *Stimmung*, which may at times, as in Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde*, grow to an almost mesmeric power. The secret of *Stimmungs*-poetry, and of the art and poetry in which mood predominates, consists in a skilful manipulation of the emotional possibilities of irregular repetition.

Repetition in art, however, never occurs unaccompanied by some variation. In its structural function, variation is implied in the very purpose of achieving variety and amplitude of associations. But even when intensification is desired, entire absence of variety would be monotonous and inartistic. Even repetitions of the same musical note are attended by variations in intensity, speed, quality of touch; all of which, though almost imperceptible,

produce telling musical effects. In the case of rhyme in poetry, even if we consider the mere matter of sound of the rhyming words aside from the really inseparable matter of significance, the most perfect rhymes offer variations in the preceding consonants combined with the rhyming vowels. The classical French "rich" rhyme seems to the modern mind tiresome because it lacks this variety; yet even here variety is pushed back merely one step fastening upon the sounds preceding the rhyming syllables.

The range of variations, from the least degree perceptible to the point where they threaten to overwhelm all sense of repetition and identity, is very great. In a general way it may be said that modernity, development in all arts, can historically be shown always to have been attended by an increasing freedom of variation, and by, not a weakening, but a relegation to a less obvious, though quite as essential, position, of repetition. Greater freedom, less rigidity of form, the incessant triumphs of Romanticism over Classicism, mean ultimately, not, as is often said, displacement of order by disorder, a futile triumph of formlessness over form, but the development of a keener sense of essential identity delving more deeply through the growing splendors of variation, a greater ability to penetrate to the foundations of things, a more incisive power of synthetic perception. It is true that at the beginning of every great movement there is usually an outbreak of disorder, but the laws of development soon sift the permanent from the transitory. The peculiar character of obsolescence in forms of art and literature rests in their being too explicit, too "complete," too definite, too limited in complex suggestiveness; attributes all of which spring from too obvious repetitions of fundamental elements, insufficiently relieved, amplified, enriched by significant variation. Too great explicitness produces threadbare monotony of restatement. As art develops, the fundamental elements of it become more plastic, and elaboration takes greater freedom.

Confining ourselves to a consideration of poetry, it is evident that the more comprehensive, complex, and close-knit, the more analogous to the highest forms of biological organization a work

of poetry is—i. e., the more vital and numerous the relations between each part and every other part are—the more significant must be the elements establishing and emphasizing these relations. The most highly organized form of poetry is the drama. Lyrical poetry, though it may be more intense, more penetrating, more subtle, more exquisite, more true in some particular direction, can never achieve the breadth, complexity, pregnancy, comprehensive and vital synthesis, which are the glory of the great drama. Epic poetry, on the other hand, though it may equal the drama in the synthesis of what is essential, “historical,” in life, especially in that of the past, yet cannot achieve the directness, the elemental compactness, the supreme fitness, of the texture and organization of the drama. The great drama compared with the great epic is as the best type of a modern ocean steamer, with all its lines trimmed down to greatest power of resistance combined with greatest mobility, with not an inch of space wasted, and with all parts so related to each other as to make possible an instant and most effective response of the whole complex mechanism to the will of the guiding hand; compared with a reconstructed Noah’s ark, safe, slow, leisurely, rich in all the treasures, memories, and associations of the patient earth.

It is this combination of greatest complexity and most effective interrelation—i. e., of this synthetic energy and high nervous pressure—of its organization which gives to the drama in the highest degree the quality of suspense. Suspense, then, must be the ultimate test of the structure of the drama. Under the head of suspense comes whatever *arouses*, *intensifies*, and *amplifies* one’s interest in the progress of the drama. Where it is lacking there is some deficiency, either in the intensity or in the variety of the dramatic action. Whenever a dramatist is in a position to choose between several forms in which he might present his story, he has to take the one producing the greatest suspense, even if by doing so he rejects others of apparently greater intrinsic beauty, as symmetry, balance, moderation, elegance, or smoothness. In German literature some of the most poetic dramas—Goethe’s *Iphigenia*, *Tasso*, and *Faust*—are faulty as dramas for the chief reason that the requirement of suspense has been subordinated to that of a

more abstract form of poetic statement. The pure lyric knows no suspense, because it utters a mode of feeling without regard to origin and issue; when suspense enters into a lyrical theme, it produces a romance; when it becomes a prominent part of the poetic effect a ballad results. In epic poetry there is considerable suspense. But it is only one element among others, all serving the chief purpose of giving a broad picture of people in their fundamental relations to their times. There is in the ideal epic always a broad strain of reflection, of the thought of prose, of quiet, comprehensive summing-up of the main forces of life. The very fact that the action is presented as occurring in the past detaches it from our intensest interests; which is still more obvious in the "I" epic, because in this case it is evident on the face of the story that the main person passed through all the vicissitudes of his past, presumably triumphant, overcoming his troubles at least to the extent of weighing and weaving into the fabric of his experience their significance—which is the only real triumph life offers. But the dramatic form is entirely dependent upon suspense. By conforming to the requirements of suspense, by transforming itself in obedience to the dictates of it, the story, the "fable," becomes the dramatic plot, amplified into the drama.

The conclusion might be drawn from this that the melodrama must be the highest form of drama, for its purpose surely is to produce the most lurid forms of suspense. But luridness represents strength only to crude minds prone to measure strength by explosive violence of outburst, and not yet trained to the deeper though soberer test of the quality of endurance. True dramatic suspense is not a mere superadded external sensational effect—a stage trick, as it were—but an integral part of the very warp and woof of the dramatic subject.

FOUR CLASSES OF REPETITION IN THE DRAMA

Repetition in the drama may be related to the poetic form, to the manner and forms in which ideas are expressed, and to the dramatic action itself. In most cases there is no real distinction between the last two heads, the second properly being dependent on the third; yet this division will presently justify itself by

assisting us in defining our problem. In addition to these functions, repetition serves as a signal to the spectator.

1. *Repetition as poetic form.*—Under the head of poetic form belong all the repetitions, regular or not, called rhyme, rhythm, meter, alliteration; and those involved in formal symmetry or balance. Being common to all forms of poetry, they cannot have specifically dramatic functions, and are therefore negligible.

The same is not the case with those infinite subtleties of repetition of sounds called sound symbolism. Although they have been exploited principally in lyrical poetry, especially of the last century, their purpose being that of creating “atmosphere” (*Stimmung*), yet we shall see that through this same function they fulfil a very important office in creating suspense in a certain class of dramas.

2. *Repetition for the purpose of rhetorical emphasis.*—Under the second head, that of forms of expression, belong a very great number of cases of repetition of words or phrases serving the purpose of emphasis, which yet produce no dramatic suspense because they have no important bearing on the dramatic action. These are the cases, usually called rhetorical, occurring in great numbers in the dramas of the early stages of the rebirth of German literature, chiefly those of Lessing, the “Storm-and-Stress,” including Goethe’s and Schiller’s early dramas, and again in Grillparzer’s, Hebbel’s, and Otto Ludwig’s dramas. They are accounted for by the purpose of vivacity of dialogue, vividness of expression, or any stylistic peculiarity incident to speech and conversation in general; or characteristic, not of a particular dramatic character, situation, or action, but of the general style or manner of a poet, or of a “school” of poetry which in these instances is obviously Shakespearean. The term “rhetorical” is here used with a reservation, because rhetorical utterance in its true sense should refer in the drama to all forms of expression conveying in the most impressive and adequate manner the emotions, ideas, and general conception of events, situations, and characters which the dramatist has in mind. Dramatic technique, and the problem of suspense, should therefore properly be regarded as parts of rhetoric.

Two examples from Lessing’s *Emilia Galotti* representing this form of repetition will show that, being common to all forms of

utterance, it has no specific and organic relations to the dramatic form. In Act I, scene 6, Marinelli's invariable answer to the anxious inquiries of the prince regarding the identity of Emilia Galotti with the obscure woman who is to be married to Count Appiani the same day, is: "Eben die." Finally, in desperation, the prince breaks out: "Sprich dein verdammtes 'Eben die' noch einmal, und stoss mir den Dolch ins Herz." Whereupon Marinelli answers: "Eben die." In Act I, scene 4, Conti, who painted the picture of Emilia, says:

Wie viel geht da *verloren*!—Aber, wie ich sage, dass ich es weiss, was hier *verloren* gegangen, und wie es *verloren* gegangen und warum es *verloren* gehen müssen: darauf bin ich ebenso stolz, und stolzer, als ich auf alles das bin, was ich nicht *verloren* gehen lassen.

In the latter case the painter repeats the word "verloren" because he is excited, just as anyone in the same state of mind and situation would do. It is true there is a relation between the painter's state of mind, and the beauty of Emilia Galotti which is the cause of the subsequent tragedy, but the connection between his repeated utterance of the word "verloren" and the tragic result of the train of events started by her beauty is too remote and indirect to present itself with any degree of clearness to our minds. Our interest is naïvely centered on a naturalness and vivacity of utterance which does not stop to hunt up synonyms to introduce variety. There is no suspense in this repetition.

3. *Repetition as an element of dramatic structure.*—It is therefore only the repetitions classed under the third head, those related to the structure of the drama, which hold the nucleus of our problem. The problem thus resolves itself into the relations between repetitions of certain parts of the drama and dramatic motivation.¹ Dramatic motivation, however, is governed by the laws of association of ideas.

ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS IN THE DRAMA

Association of ideas is impossible without some form of repetition. Thought consists in connecting different data of experi-

¹ The next study in this series on Romanticism, to be published presently, will be a detailed study of the peculiarities of Romantic motivation. I have to limit myself in this paper to a brief statement of the general forms of association.

ence by means of some elements contained in all of them, which are perceived in some respect to be identical. This identity may be inherent or ideal, or it may be incidental, imputed to an external—i. e., actual or pragmatic—adjunct of some experience. In accordance with this distinction, logicians since Aristotle have divided association of ideas into two classes, characterizing the one by similarity, the other by contiguity. In discursive thought both forms of association are essential. In trying to single out and define the essential elements of our consciousness, whether they be abstract ideas, as “good” or “just,” or concepts of concrete things, as “horse” or “cow,” especially in the modern positivistic or pragmatic conception of reality, we have to collect and subject to the tests of similarity and contiguity as many data as are accessible to us.

There is a great difference between the objective and the psychological aspects of these two categories, especially as regards contiguity. Objectively, all data would come under the head of contiguity which form essential parts in the description of an external object, say a horse. We form an objective definition of the idea of a horse by applying the criteria of similarity and disparity which are ideal, to all the data, *the contiguous evidence*, which horses, as distinguished from all other objects of external reality, furnish us. Psychologically, however, all those qualities come under the head of contiguity which, whether inherent in the data given or not, for some subjective reason induce certain universally communicable conditions of consciousness in all normal persons.

As regards association by contiguity, it may be essential or irrelevant. Irrelevancy in objective association by contiguity would refer to the insignificant character of details of description or definition adduced—such as, for instance, the average thickness of horsehair established by elaborate measurements as part of the description and definition of a common cart-horse—though this item may be relevant for biological definitions. In psychological association, irrelevancy means lack of universal communicability of experiences—as, for instance, the insufficient communicability due to that peculiar form of egotism called sentimentality.

In the drama and in normal life the processes of association are not discursive. Their purpose is not definition in terms of discursive thinking, but the working-out, the organic unfolding, of some complex state of passion; or, if it please us to use the term "definition," it is definition in terms of organic passional consistency. This passional association, similarly as discursive association, is subject to the criteria of similarity—including its opposite, disparity—and contiguity. However, the processes belonging to dramatic thinking being passional and dynamic, instead of discursive and fixed, similarity and disparity take the forms of correspondency and contrariety of passional reaction, or agreement and contrast of emotional effect upon different characters, the former, correspondency, producing the cumulative and climacteric effects of similar passions and dramatic forces working together; the latter governing the proper and plausible use of dramatic contrast. The use of contrasts in characters, situations, and actions is therefore not a mere artifice to produce an external effect of diversity, but an inherent requirement of dramatic composition. Richness of texture, breadth of significance, universality of "appeal," depth of wisdom, in a drama depend upon the wealth of definition, often miscalled suggestiveness, which governs the right use of similarity and contrast in the selection and arrangement of the structural parts of the drama. In *Romeo and Juliet* we feel an essential bond of identity between the acts of gentleness, devotion, humility, of the lovers; but we find the same bond, that of uncompromising affection, between Romeo's self-control in the scene ending in Mercutio's death and in Tybalt's self-abandonment to murderous hatred. Further, Mercutio and Tybalt are similar in their love of a fight, their quick tempers, their lack of regard for consequences; they are essentially opposites through Mercutio's good nature and Tybalt's fierce sullenness; yet all these traits have their roots in that lusty and potent vitality of youth which is *the ultimate bond of the unity of action in this drama*.

Dramatic association by contiguity takes place when two passional experiences are linked because through some accident of time, place, or other circumstance they occurred in emphatic

conjunction. The fragrance of lilacs amid which the lover first kissed his lady will be fraught with potent associations for him as long as his love lasts. This form of association occurring constantly in normal intercourse, being in fact our principal means of giving individuality and concreteness and vividness to our ideas and emotions, is very important in the drama. A few cases in which repetition is used to serve its purpose are: in Otto Ludwig's *Der Erbförster*, "im heimlichen Grund" (nine times), characterizing the scene of the murder; and "mit dem gelben Riemen" (five times), individualizing the rifle with which the deed is committed; "Park" in Kleist's *Hermannsschlacht*, giving the concreteness of locality to Thusnelda's brutal plan of revenge; "Gitterthor" in Grillparzer's *Hero*, serving to retain, through its most prominent local adjunct, the first impression created by the two youths from Abydos; and many others.

4. *Repetition as a signal to the spectator.*—Repetition, then, is an essential part of the very warp and woof of dramatic structure. But it has, in addition, an important external function. The average theater-goer, noting rather naïvely the sequence of events on the stage as an engaging spectacle, without concerning himself much with any underlying identities binding this sequence into an organic process—unless some close personal interest be involved, in which case it is marvelous how speculative he becomes, and with what lightning quickness—this normal person would be greatly assisted in keeping his attention fixed on the structural relations of the details passing in review before him, by some not too obvious hints, some not too impertinent or officious sign-posts now and then when the trail of association becomes dim or frazzled. Repetition is such a sign pointing the association of ideas from a thousand blind alleys leading to the dead walls of utter darkness, upon the highroad of the poetic purpose. Any part of a drama that is repeated with sufficient frequency and under circumstances arresting attention must acquire an emphatic eminence among its less distinguished fellows.

Repetition thus inevitably performing both the more external function of intensification of utterance and the essential function of uniting the several parts of a drama into an organic structure,

it would be radically wrong to treat these two functions as separate and different things, rather than as integral parts in the working-out of the structural unity and the organic life of the drama. Both of these functions must therefore be treated together, except in a few cases when particular considerations make separation necessary.

WHAT PARTS OF THE DRAMA CAN BE REPEATED

The parts of a drama which can be repeated are: whole scenes, as Herod's two returns in Hebbel's *Herodes und Mariamne*; anything coming under the head of action or dramatic event, and more particularly ideas or objects expressed in the discourse; and finally single words or brief phrases, used as keywords. A study of the entire subject of repetition would have to cover the whole of dramatic technique. In limiting ourselves to the repetition of words—excluding synonyms, for, important though they are, their admission would prevent any possibility of delimitation—we have the advantage of fixing our attention upon the most definite and elementary part of the dramatic structure, the part most easily dealt with as to frequency of occurrence and structural relation, and at the same time serving as a means of prying open the whole problem of dramatic suspense. The faculty determining the elaboration of the dramatic dialogue is in the last analysis a quick and subtle sense of words, consisting both of an imaginative vision presenting all the possibilities of meaning, all the different facets, of a word at once; and of a gift of a keen dialectic, a verbal sagacity, seizing at once upon the essential characteristic of each meaning. This sense of words, so ready and fundamentally sound that it might please itself in any fantastic extravagance, in any exuberant divagation, without running the least danger of losing in the end its sober, safe, and steady way, is the basis and justification of most of Shakespeare's punning and skylarking in quest of "conceits." Among the contemporaries, Ibsen has carried the dialectic use of words in his dialogue to an astonishing degree of perfection. Especially in his later works, as *John Gabriel Borkman*, a study of his dialogue practically coincides with a study of his keywords.

REPETITION AND MOTIVATION

Any part of a drama—an action, an event, parts or the whole of the conduct of a character, speeches, even external matters of stage-setting, costumes, and so forth—is properly motivated if it is organically related to a central idea dominating the whole play. Whatever is inconsistent with this idea, whatsoever disturbs the essential unity of action in a drama, can therefore bring about no dramatic suspense, no matter how absorbing it may be in itself.

The term “dramatic suspense” expresses the attitude of anticipation on the part of the spectator with reference to the fundamental idea of a drama—i. e., the central interest of the dramatic action. This interest presents a double aspect, the two sides of which, though organically inseparable, yet have to be marked off with greater precision than is usually done by writers on the drama. They are: the organic consistency of the action and the cultural value of it to mankind. The former calls for judgments of possibility or probability or necessity—that is, of truth or reality on any plane between the crudest literalism or naturalism and the most attenuated and remote “idealism;” the latter, for judgments of values, for appreciations of the actions represented, with reference to the cultural requirements of human life. They have to be treated separately.

Under the first head our attention is centered on the fundamental forces of life as they actually are and operate. Whether they are good or bad, beautiful or the reverse, attractive or not, is irrelevant. They may be either external or psychological.

II. EXTERNAL MOTIVATION

The external forces determining the course of a drama may have the mere significance of a “plot” appealing to a naïve curiosity which is satisfied with a *dénouement*, with the lifting of the veil of uncertainty dimming the eyes of the spectators, or more commonly of the characters of the play, to the circumstances in the net of which they are entangled. These circumstances are usually not of a deep significance, and, though they may produce disastrous and even tragic results, are not intrinsically tragic. They belong properly to comedy, and appear most commonly

as errors of some kind—mistaken identities, misunderstandings, intrigues, false inferences, and so on. In Lessing's *Nathan der Weise*, Act II, scene 7, and Act III, scene 8, the names "Stauffen" and "Wolf," and in Act III, scene 7, the words "Ebenbild" and "Bild" are repeated in a significant manner in order to prepare us for the dénouement. In *Nathan*, Act IV, scene 6, the word "Brautkleid" is repeated as a false lead in order to intensify expectation. In Kleist's *Familie Schroffenstein* the word "Finger" (the finger missing from the hand of the body of the drowned child) is repeated a score of times to arouse expectations as to a possible clearing of the mystery surrounding the death of the child. In Kleist's *Käthchen von Heilbronn* temporary suspense is effected by the word "Brief." The word is repeated about seventeen times in a conversation between Graf von Strahl and Käthchen. We know that the life of the former might depend on his reading the "Brief." Again, when the castle is in flames, Kunigunde requires that Käthchen take from the burning castle the "Futtermal" in which the "Bild" of Graf von Strahl is supposed to be. In reality it contains papers relating to Kunigunde's claim against the count, which she is supposed to have destroyed before her betrothal to him. Kunigunde says: "Das Bild mit dem Futtermal, Herr Graf von Strahl! Das Bild mit dem Futtermal!" and to Käthchen: "Geh, Mädchen, geh, schaff Bild mir und Futtermal." The word is spoken eleven times. It has the double effect of making us anxious as to the safety of Käthchen, who is almost certain to find her death in the flames in trying to recover the "Futtermal," and of arousing suspicions as to Kunigunde's motives even before we know the real facts of the case, because she appears singularly cruel and selfish in sending Käthchen into the fire for picture and case, and again for the case alone. This repetition partly belongs under the head of psychological motivation. The word "Handschuh," repeated fourteen times in *Der Prinz von Homburg*, serves to bring about a partial dénouement, the revealment of Homburg's love for Natalie.

The repetition of a word is more significant when it is related not so much to a mere dénouement—that is, when its office is not

so much to tease and satisfy curiosity—but serves to emphasize and individualize an inevitable development toward an important, triumphant or tragic, issue. The dramatist in this case does not, as the artificer of “plot” and “dénouement,” expect us to make more or less frivolous or clever, at any rate haphazard, guesses, and to express ourselves yet outdone at the end by his ingenuity; he does not enter into a contest of clever guessing with his audience; nor are his issues to surprise us, though the manner and time of their appearance may not always be anticipated; but he rather expects to confirm our profoundest anticipations, to live up to our loftiest sense of the eternal fitness, the deepest and direst logic, of things.

Hebbel furnishes some telling examples of repetition belonging here. His earliest one is that of “*fünf Tage*” in *Judith*. It occurs in Act III. The besieged citizens of Bethulia are trying to determine how much longer they can resist the besieging army of Holofernes. One of them, the “Älteste,” says:

“Liebe Brüder, habt noch *fünf Tage* Geduld und harrt der Hülfe des Herrn.”

Judith: “Und wenn der Herr noch *fünf Tage* länger braucht?”

Der Älteste: “Dann sind wir tot! Will der Herr uns helfen, so muss es in diesen *fünf Tagen* geschehen.”

Judith (feierlich, als ob sie ein Todesurteil spräche): “Also in *fünf Tagen* muss er sterben.”

Judith takes a vow to free her city by the assassination of Holofernes. She goes to him, offering herself to him and promising that she will make him lord of the Jews. Toward the end of her conversation with him she says:

“Auf *fünf Tage* hab’ ich genug [of undefiled food to eat], und in *fünf Tagen* bringt er’s [Jehovah] zu Ende.”

Holofernes: “Die Erlaubniss hast du [to remain alone]. Ich liess die Schritte eines Weibes noch nie bewachen. Also in *fünf Tagen*, Judith!”

Judith: “In *fünf Tagen*, Holofernes.”

In Otto Ludwig’s *Der Erbförster* the words “gelbe Riemen” (“Gewehr mit dem gelben Riemen”) and “heimlichen Grund” are repeated five and nine times respectively, the former identifying

the murderer and fixing our attention in a certain direction, and the latter individualizing and giving a certain symbolic significance to the scene of the murder. Some cases requiring mere mention are the repetition of "Ritter" in the cave scene in Kleist's *Schroffenstein*; "Hunde" (twelve times) in Kleist's *Penthesilea*, "Erzbischof von Mainz" (cf. "der Mainzer" in II, 132) in Grillparzer's *Ottokar*, I, 50; II, 19/20, 49/50; "Wo ist Margarethe nun," *ibid.*, II, 520, and III, 469.

The most significant case of the repetition of a word, pointing to the catastrophe by punctuating the decisive steps in the progress of the action, is that of "Licht" (and "Lampe") in Grillparzer's *Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen*. The word is repeated more than thirty times in various associations, constantly assuming additional, more complex, and more pregnant significance. It is necessary to consider this case somewhat in detail, because it substantiates an interesting conclusion. The frequent repetition begins in the fourth act, and its purpose is to lead the priest to suspicion, thence to certainty, and finally to his murderous decision. The temple guard insists that he has seen a man jump into the sea in the morning, at Hero's tower, and that a light has been burning in the latter all night, in violation of the rules.

1297 "Und dort in jenem Turme brannte *Licht*

Die ganze Nacht."

1299 " . . . vermeiden,

Durch *Licht* und Flamme Bösgesinnten . . .

Den Weg zu zeigen."

1304 "Sie wusst' es wohl, und dennoch brannte *Licht*."

1320 Tempelhüter: "Und sah' hinein, nichts schaut' ich als ein *Licht*."

1328 Tempelhüter: "Ei Herr! und warum brannte denn das *Licht*."

1339 Tempelhüter: "Allein das *Licht* an jenem, jenem Fenster!"

1348 Priester: "Ruf' mir Ianthen."

Tempelhüter: "Aber, Herr, das *Licht*!"

The priest's suspicion is aroused, and he interrogates Hero about the happenings of the night.

1433 Priester: " . . . Man sah

In deinem Turme *Licht* die ganze Nacht."

The priest is now convinced and plans Leander's death.

1445 Priester: "Kommt dann die Nacht und siehst du wieder *Licht*?"

The plans have been laid to make Leander's death certain if he follows the summons of the light.

1791 Tempelhüter [to the priest]: "Siehst du das *Licht*? "

Hero arrives, speaking her longing for Leander in a monologue, the first part of which is addressed to her lamp:

1798 "Noch ist's nicht Nacht, und doch geht alles *Licht*
Von dir aus "

and

1803: Hero: "Hier will ich sitzen, will dein *Licht* bewahren."

And in many other places: 1839, 1865 (twice), 1872, 1876, 1881, and 1890 (after finding Leander's body). This repetition is reinforced by a frequent repetition of "Lampe" in the same associations. The word "Licht" is closely associated with nearly every step of the action descending to the catastrophe, its presence and absence becoming almost a symbol of hope and disaster, life and death.

A close relation to the progressing action of the drama is also held by the word "Ring" associated with "Grab" in Hebbel's *Gyges und sein Ring*, all in Act I, scene 1 ("Halle"):

". . . ein Königsring,
Und dennoch kannst du für dein Königsreich
Ihn dir nicht kaufen
Doch nie vernahm ich noch von diesem *Ring* "

Gyges: ". . . Aus einem *Grabe*
Aus einem *Grabe* in Thessalien "

Kandaulus: "Du hast ein *Grab* erbrochen und entweiht."

Gyges proceeds to tell that he found the grave broken open by robbers, and in it "Erblickte ich auf einmal diesen *Ring*." The word is repeated about twenty-four times. This repetition differs from that of "Licht" in two particulars. First, while it is obvious that the repetition of "Licht" in *Hero* was deliberately resorted to for the purpose of emphasis, there is no emphasis intended in the case of the "Ring." It is incident to normal narrative and colloquy; and yet, recurring as it does in conjunction with gruesome or mysterious or suggestive associations, as "König," "Grab," deeds of violence, a mysterious origin, it does intensify,

by limiting and qualifying the object of interest, our and Kandaulus' state of suspense. In the latter case its function being psychological, will not be discussed here.

It might appear that in cases like the one of Gyges' "Ring," in which the intensifying effect of repetition is not primarily intended, and where the dramatic interest is not centered upon the word at all, but upon an object or idea named by the word, as in "Licht" and "Ring"—that is where the repetition of the word is incident to the progress of the dramatic action—we cannot regard repetition as a means of suspense. It might be said that every new emergence of the object and idea, accompanied by the word signifying it, by marking a new step in the action of the drama, must involve a partial *dénouement*, a relief from previous tension and uncertainty. But we have to consider that dramatic action is not a sum of disjointed events or facts, which could be considered and weighed individually, but an organism in which each part is indissolubly connected with the whole. As the action progresses, as the plot thickens, the relations of each part of the action, each event and idea, to the whole constantly change, expand and multiply. Each new step, while it may explain some object of dramatic concern on the part of the audience, yet at the same time adds to suspense until the final catastrophe. The dramatic possibilities gather before our eyes as the thunderstorm upon the darkening sky. Now and then there may be a moment of clearing, merely to give way, in the next instant, to a still more portentous phase of the expected storm.

The use of the word "Ring" in *Gyges und sein Ring* differs in another respect from that of "Licht" in *Hero*. It conveys a sense of an awful, fateful power, a magic potency, whereas "Licht" though it has a slightly symbolic significance, as in *Hero's* monologue, has no unearthly significance. It represents fate.

REPETITION RELATED TO DRAMATIC FATE

"Fate" is the collective term comprising the fundamental forces directing the course of the dramatic action. Only in plays that have merely a plot and *dénouement* fate has no place, except as the dramatist's private Jack-in-the-box contrivance for causing a

momentary attack of the shivers to his audience. In serious drama it abides in every detail, swaying the action step by step.

Dramatic fate has two aspects in accordance with the type of drama in which it operates. In that class of dramas in which the chief matter of interest is the concatenation of events—i. e., the external action or story—"fate" is the collective name of all the supreme external and mechanical forces of existence. In the psychological drama, on the other hand, it embraces all the internal, psychological forces—that is, the forces guiding, transforming, controlling, the minds of men. External fate always appears in the guise of extraneous violence opposing and thwarting the wills and purposes of men, whereas psychological fate, being of the very warp and woof of these wills and purposes, of the innermost essence of personality, does not appear as a supervening force, but as the abiding inner cogency, the inevitable intrinsic logic of things, thrusting the conscious will which supposes itself ensconced in the heart of personality, be it good or evil, outside the citadel whence to make its valiant but futile assaults upon the Invincible. This is the dramatic significance of the supreme Romantic article of faith, "Personality is Fate," which combines in a paradoxical conception of ultimate irresponsibility the opposites of absolute freedom of the will and of an absolute subjective fatalism.

In *Gyges und sein Ring* both these forms of fate appear side by side; the preordained destruction of Gyges and his wife being the external manifestation of fate, and its psychological operation directing the course of *Kandaulus*.

At present we are concerned in detail only with external fate. Representing, as it does, the external forces of life it must appear, not directly, in *propria persona*, so to speak, as "fate," "Schicksal," but as something implied in external events and circumstances. It is by this immanency of fate that the facts of reality become symbolic. Only what is fraught with fate, and as far as it is so, is symbolic.¹ Symbolism is an abiding consciousness of inherent structural or organic relations between the details of reality and

¹ The only fundamental distinction between "symbol" and "allegory" compatible with historical usage seems to me this, that a symbol appears vested with the authority of fate. From the "Storm-and-Stress" movement until the Romanticism of the present day, usage has never wavered in this respect.

fate. The bald word "fate," "Schicksal," frequently repeated as in Schiller's *Wallenstein* (over twenty times), causes not so much suspense as rather a weary sense of poetic self-consciousness and self-interpretation overdone. It is far more effective, in a dramatic sense, in indirect, symbolic presentation.

The differences in the dramatic use of fate mark an important line of development in the history of the German drama from Lessing to Romanticism. In Lessing's *Minna von Barnhelm* the word, or rather the object, "Ring," repeated about as frequently as in Hebbel's drama, bears a relation to the external action of Lessing's play analogous to that of "Ring" in *Gyges*. It serves as a bond connecting different phases in the progress of the story. In Lessing's play its function ends there; in Hebbel's it serves the further purpose of giving the awful authority of fate to the dramatic events and passions. Before the symbolic possibilities of external circumstances had been rediscovered and their uses exploited anew by the Romanticists, dramatists had no means of enforcing the fate-begotten sweep and validity of their actions upon their audiences, except by baldly giving them a name—a proceeding too direct, too obvious, too devoid of suggestiveness, and too monotonous to have much dramatic value. Schiller, who greatly lacked the power of symbolizing, produced a strong, though clumsy, symbol only once, in the Black Knight in *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*; but he made almost no use of symbolizing words. He rode, therefore, the word "Schicksal" nearly to death, not because he "trieb das Schicksal," as Caroline Schlegel wittily said of him—for every dramatist does that—but because, on account of his deficient symbolic vision, his conception of fate lacked variety and organic relation to reality.

Fate-symbolism was carried to its extreme limit, and to the point of absurdity, in the so-called "fate drama" holding sway in German literature during the decade beginning about 1815. In Zacharias Werner's short play, *Der vierundzwanzigste Februar*, the word "Fluch" is repeated about fifty-two times, in order to drive home to the shuddering sense of the audience the demoniac power dominating the course of events. In the same play the words, "Messer," "Sense," "Hund," "Sohn," occur for a similar

purpose. In Müllner's *Die Schuld* the words tellingly repeated are "Schuld," "Rache," "Stahl," "Blut," "Tod," and "Mord." In Kleist's *Familie Schroffenstein*, though not a fate drama proper, in which the passion of hatred becomes a demoniac possession taking the function of fate, the word "Rache" is repeated, at the outset, about twenty-six times, and "Mord" about forty times. In Grillparzer's drama *Die Ahnfrau* the words "Ahnfrau" and "Dolch" are used in a similar manner as in the fate dramas proper, though in a somewhat less lurid manner. There is one instance of this romantic use of words in the repetition of "Traum" in Lessing's *Miss Sara Sampson* (I, 4 and 7). The same word, endowed with greater superstitious power, is repeated in Kleist's *Das Käthchen von Heilbronn*, where it is associated with the words "Engel," "Marianne," and "eines Kaisers Tochter," likewise repeated.

In Richard Wagner's dramas the repeated words frequently are the names of symbolic objects—objects endowed with superstitious, demoniac, or generally animistic powers. Some of these are "Gold" in *Rheingold*, (about twenty times); "Schwert" in *Die Walküre* (about twenty-five times), and in *Siegfried* (about thirty times); "Ring" in *Siegfried* (about twenty times), and in *Die Götterdämmerung* (about forty-four times); "Speer" in *Parsifal*.

SOUND-SYMBOLISM

In many of these cases of sensational repetition the mere sound of the emphatic word, aside from the relation of its meaning or the object designated by it to the dramatic action, is of considerable significance. Words like "Fluch" "Rache," "Stahl," "Messer," produce, and are by the sensational writers intended to produce, strong emotional effects. Nor is this sound symbolism,¹ if properly used, illegitimate in aiding and intensifying suspense. Wagner in joining the meaning and sound of the

¹ The Romanticists made much of this symbolism, as: A. W. Schlegel's *Briefe über Poesie. Silbenmaas, etc.* (S. W., Vol. VII); Fr. Schlegel's *Alarkos*; Tieck's "*U*" *Romance of Sir Wulf*; Tieck's symphony prefacing his comedy, *Die verkehrte Welt*; Hoffman's *Kreiseriana* and *Kater Murr*. In lyrical poetry this sound-symbolism has, especially in the last century, been a very prominent means, often overdone, of creating "atmosphere," *Stimmung*, in German as well as in English literature, and in the French Symbolists of the second half of the nineteenth century.

words with musical symbolism has in his *Leitmotive* made a masterly use of repetition for the purpose partly of intelligibility and partly of suspense. It is sufficient to refer to Brunhilde's oath on the spear in *Götterdämmerung*, where meaning and sound of the word "Spitze," emphasized by the sharp rise to the musical pitch given the first syllable of the word, unite in startling dramatic significance.

FATE SYMBOLISM BY ANALOGY

There is a still subtler, but no less powerful, use of repetition to accomplish fate symbolism, the typical example of which is found throughout Grillparzer's *Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen*, in the constant recurrence of the words "Meer" and "Wellen." This case is peculiar in being even less direct than those of the fate dramas. In the latter the symbols of fate have a direct causal connection with fate, being its tools. In Grillparzer's drama, however, while the "Meer" ultimately brings about the catastrophe, its more important function lies in a different direction. It was Grillparzer's express purpose to eliminate any guilt, or at least any consciousness of it, in Hero. Her passion is to take its course with the same elemental simplicity, directness, inherent rightness, with which the sea follows every fluctuation of natural forces. The admission of consciousness of moral issues, of any self-consciousness whatever, in Hero would have thwarted his purpose. He chose the title, overlong and sentimental though it is, to suggest his purpose—as Goethe, in *Wahlverwandtschaften*, used a simile taken from physical science to emphasize the character of the passion depicted. The repetitions of "Meer" and "Wellen" serve the purpose of reminding us again and again of this idea, pointing the unswerving way of destiny through all the tangle of individual initiative and psychological reaction. The intended effect of suspense upon the spectator is produced through association by analogy. We anticipate the course and issue of the master-passion, because we are made to feel that the force which drives the waves of the sea shattering upon the rocks by Hero's tower is similar to that which dashes the lovers upon the battlements of settled conventions.

DRAMATIC "STIMMUNG"

Symbolic repetition, through its indeterminateness and suggestiveness, produces, when properly used, an effect of general atmosphere, a dramatic *Stimmung*, which at times, as in *Hero*, is as potent, as mesmeric, as *Stimmung* in lyrical poetry. It is worth while to draw the conclusion that *Stimmung* is not, as generally supposed, intrinsically lyrical, and that scenes of *Stimmung* in a drama therefore are not to be set aside as lyrical, but that, whenever in a drama it contains suspense, it is genuinely dramatic. This is the melodramatic element which within certain limits is indispensable to the drama, as Shakespeare shows. Without it the drama lacks richness, color, atmosphere, and the necessary warmth. It is chiefly through the want of it that Schiller's dramas are "thin," or threadbare. It may, however, degenerate, as in the fate drama, into mere sensationalism, analogous to the scare headlines of the yellow press, arousing wild forebodings unsupported in the context by any additional detailed evidence giving distinct significance to the alarming shriek of nondescript emotionalism.

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATION

In the cases so far discussed repetition is used to direct attention to the story, the sequence of events, and the issue of the dramatic action. It is in these cases an instrument both for knitting different events together and for calling our attention to what is essential in them. It is an important part of the structure of the drama, and at the same time of the evidence from which the spectator draws inferences as to the issue of the action before him. It is part of external, mechanical motivation, and is therefore found most frequently in the drama of action, the highest form of which is the so-called historical drama. It has also appeared in a very important passional function, derived from the psychological skill of dramatists trained in the school of Romanticism—the function of engaging the emotions of the spectator.

We turn now to its use in affecting the relations of the dramatic characters to each other—i. e., to repetition as part of psychological motivation. The psychological drama was rediscovered by Romanticism, and its modern uses were developed

under its influence. It soon gained ascendancy over the older drama, surviving the fall of the Romantic philosophy of life by annexing subsequent theories of life, chief among which is Evolutionary Materialism, to its domain. The drama of Naturalism is psychological, not objective or historical. Indeed, on surveying the history of the drama, of the ages of Sophocles and Euripides, of Shakespeare, of Calderon and Lope de Vega, of Molière, of Ibsen, it is difficult not to suspect that a supreme historical drama, combining the breadth and exactness, the actuality, of history with the subtleties and unity of psychology, of which we now and then hear cheerful prophecies and encounter interesting though misshapen specimens, is a chimera. However that may be, since the rise of Romanticism the psychological drama has been the dominant form of the drama. The most powerful attempt at a historical drama since that time, Grillparzer's *König Ottokar*, is psychological even to a fault, the direct influences bringing about the downfall of the hero being on the whole rather paltry intrigues. Shakespeare in *Antony and Cleopatra*, in which also the undoing of a great historical character through self-indulgence is shown, employs personal intrigue also as one of the inevitable incidents of the situation. But he ignores it altogether in motivating Antony's downfall, which is caused by more momentous, fateful, "historical," forces than insidious schemes of base and contemptible characters.

In the evolution of psychological motivation in the modern German drama we can distinguish three main stages. In the pre-Romantic drama, the drama of Lessing, the "Storm-and-Stress," and Schiller—who, although the ten last and most important years of his activity coincided with the first high tide of Romanticism, yet never comprehended its spirit—there is a certain amount of psychological motivation. Lessing, especially in *Minna von Barnhelm* and *Emilia Galotti*, shows considerable psychological knowledge, surpassing Schiller in the subtleness of his analysis, and the greater freedom and naturalness of his conceptions of personalities. Yet in all of these dramas the main interest is absorbed by the events, the external sequence and issue of the dramatic action. The characters serve merely the purpose

of accounting for these events; that is, the characters themselves are not the ultimate centers, but only the means of motivation, subordinate to the story part of the drama. To be sure, the "Storm-and-Stressers," especially Lenz and young Goethe, insisted that character was the main concern of the serious drama; yet these theories did not bear artistic fruit until Goethe had outgrown the heyday of his titanomania.

With the advent of Romanticism—or, rather, after Romanticism had outgrown its first undramatic intoxication of transcendentalism—the relations between characters and the action in the drama became reversed. The characters or personalities now were the final objects of the dramatic interest, the ultimate entities of the drama; and, in turn, the events served merely the purpose of motivation; they were the screen of objective perception through which alone it is possible in a drama to perceive personalities. All reality, all external action and events, acquired a psychological symbolism. A consistent, however one-sided, animistic view of life discerned in all external phenomena manifestations of personalities, hidden only in a measure sufficient to create the sensation and suggestion of infinite possibilities of further revelation. Novalis' theory that history must become a fairy-tale before it has poetic value accords with the use Kleist makes of actual and historical reality in *Penthesilea*, *Käthchen von Heilbronn*, and *Die Hermannsschlacht*, in this respect that the final test to which every part of the external action is subjected is that of consistency with the psychological purpose. It finds its dramatic application to historical subjects in Lessing's and Grillparzer's demand that, however much historical events are modified to serve the purpose of the dramatist, no liberties must be taken with the conceptions of historical characters. This psychological conception obtained, although a constantly growing sense of reality added continually new data to the materials of motivation, until the rise of biological materialism or the theory of biological evolution, with its attendant literary movement of contemporary Naturalism. Yet, in spite of a brief period of materialistic bluster, Naturalism did not succeed in discarding psychology. The dramatists of the preceding era had accepted

personality on the whole as a finality, troubling themselves little with accounting for it, or at most doing so in a very general way. They were content to rest their case upon phrases like "Character is fate," or "Temperament is fate," or whatever changes might be rung on the idea of the finality and ultimate validity of personality. The naturalists, in the first exaltation of a rash and shallow materialism—as, for instance, Hauptmann in *Vor Sonnenaufgang*—tried to account for personality by a biological milieu; i. e., by the material conditions determining its growth. This environment, being removed from all control by the personality produced by it, had in the first outburst of Naturalism to serve, not only as fate, but also as the hero of the drama. The possibilities of it as a hero were soon exhausted, however. Ibsen, even in his most radical milieu-play, never forsook psychology; and Hauptmann soon turned to psychological drama.

The final outcome of the development from a crass materialism through a new Romanticism no less extreme to a sane and impartial psychological Realism, the convolutions and ramifications of which are easily traceable in spite of their complexity,¹ was that the psychological drama, instead of being replaced by a more objective form, assimilated all that part of naturalistic technique which made available the richest treasury of human experience ever poured out before the eye and hand of man—the ever-growing results of modern science.

The cases of repetition of words serving psychological motivation are so numerous and various that only the most important ones can be discussed individually. They will be presented as much as possible in chronological order, treating each author separately, in order to give the force of actual demonstration to the historical survey given above. Only one type of repetition will have to be discussed separately.

The only clear case in Lessing belonging here is the repetition of "recht gern" by the Prince in *Emilia Galotti*, I, 8. The repetition of this expression of thoughtless complaisance when a human life depends upon his decision, showing the preoccupation and

¹ I have tried to indicate the main lines of this development in a paper on "Naturalism," recently published.

haste of the prince, produces a strong impression of the absorbing, and therefore threatening, character of his passion for Emilia. The frequent repetition of "Grobian" in *Minna von Barnhelm*, I, 2, bears no important relation to the action of the play. It is a secondary adornment intended to give vivacity to the characters of the speaker and the person addressed, rather than part of psychological motivation. It is related to the "rhetorical" use of repetition in the narrow sense discussed above.

It was not until Kleist that repetition became very important. In *Die Familie Schroffenstein* the fundamental idea determining the entire course of the drama is a settled disposition of distrust between two related houses, growing until it becomes a fateful obsession drawing the venom of murderous hatred from every happening, no matter how harmless, and endowing every action of the supposed enemy, no matter how ingenuous and guiltless, with a satanic intent. Years before the beginning of the action of the drama the last two remaining branches of a powerful and noble family had provided by solemn agreement that, in case either house remained without a direct descendant, its property was to accrue to the other. This agreement is assumed by certain members of both houses to induce a desire for mutual destruction. It has, therefore, an important relation to the psychological motivation of the drama. At the beginning the church bailiff, in explaining the existing circumstances to Jeronimus, says (p. 6):¹

"Seit alten Zeiten
Giebts zwischen unsern beiden Grafenhäusern
Von Rossitz und von Warwand einen *Erbvertrag*."

Jeronimus says:

"Das gehört zur Sache nicht."

Thereupon the "Kirchenvogt":

"Ei, Herr, der *Erbvertrag* gehört zur Sache."

Later Sylvester's wife says:

"Freilich wohl, man weiss
Was so besorgt sie macht: der *Erbvertrag*."

¹ Edited by Dr. Karl Siegen (Leipzig: Max Hesse).

Considerably later Jeronimus says to the count of the house:

“Ei, möglich wär’ es wohl, dasz Ruperts Sohn,
 Der doch *ermordet* sein soll, blosz gestorben,
 Und dasz von der Gelegenheit gereizt,
 Den *Erbvertrag* zu seinem Glück zu lenken,
 Der Vater es verstanden, deiner Leute,
 Die just vielleicht in dem Gebirge waren,
 In ihrer Unschuld so sich zu bedienen,
 Dasz es der Welt erscheint, als hätten wirklich
 Sie ihn *ermordet*—um mit diesem Scheine
 Des Rechts sodann den Frieden aufzukünden,
 Den Stamm von Warwand auszurotten, dann
 Das *Erbvermächtnis* sich zu nehmen.”

The obsession of hatred and distrust is emphasized through many other repetitions: The word “Mord,” with variants “Morden,” “Mörder,” occurs in all about forty times. In the love-scene between Ottokar and Agnes, Ottokar, remembering that he has sworn to destroy the “*Mörderhaus*” of Sylvester, says to Agnes:

“So brauch’ ich dich ja nicht zu *morden*!”

And Agnes asks: “*Morden?*” and later:

“Du sprachst von *Mord*.”
 “Mit wem sprachst du von *Morde?*”
 “Wollt ihr mich *morden?*”

And Ottokar says: “*Dich morden?*”

Their state of mind makes it easy for those concerned to draw rash conclusions from an apparent confession which finally turns out to furnish no evidence except of their own mad readiness to believe the worst. The word “gestanden” occurs twenty-six times. The “Kirchenvogt” says (p. 7):

“Der eine, Herr, blieb noch am Leben, und
 Der hat’s *gestanden*.”

Jeronimus: “*Gestanden?*”

Kirchenvogt: “Ja, Herr, er hat’s rein h’raus *gestanden*.”

Jeronimus: “Was hat er *gestanden?*”

Kirchenvogt: “Dass sein Herr Sylvester

Zum Morde ihn *gedungen* und bezahlt.”

Jeronimus: “Erzähl’s genau. Sprich, wie *gestand* er’s?”

The "Kirchenvogt" admits the confession consisted only of the one word, "Sylvester," and continues:

"Herr, weiter war es nichts. Denn bald darauf
Als er's *gestanden* hatt', verblich er."

The word is repeated twenty times more in the progress of the drama. It is further enforced by repetitions of "bekannt" and "öffentlich gesagt."

The word "gedungen," already mentioned, occurs five times in connection with "gestanden," as, "Der eine hat's sogar *gestanden*, du hättest ihn zum Mord *gedungen*" (p. 31).

The cause of the tragic results is the mistake made in the false construction put on the tortured man's confession. Thus the word "Irrtum" occurs, adding to suspense. Ottokar says to Agnes:

"Denn fruchtlos ist doch alles, kommt der *Irrtum*
Ans Licht nicht, der uns neckt."

Later Agnes says:

"Was ist das für ein *Irrtum* ?

Ottokar: "So wie einer, kann auch der andre *Irrtum* schwinden."

The characters interpret their impulse of hatred as "Rechtsgefühl" (p. 5), justifying and confirming their course. Jeronimus says:

"Bewaffne, wo
Ich's finde, das *Gefühl des Rechts*, den frech
Verleumdeten zu rächen."

Ottokar's reply contains the two exclamations:

"Das *Gefühl des Rechts* !" "Das *Rechtsgefühl* !"

This word is used three other times. The word "Verdacht" occurs nine times.

Likewise we find the word "Ahnung" ("ahnen"). Ottokar and Johann speak of Agnes, the maiden they have seen in the woods. Both begin to fear she may belong to the house of Warwand. Ottokar says:

"Doch meine *Ahnung* ?"

Johann: "Du hast's *geahnet*."

Ottokar: "Was hab' ich *geahnet* ?"

The word occurs four more times.

Johann has obtained possession of Agnes' "Schleier."

Ottokar "Wie kamst du denn zu diesem *Schleier*?"

and repeats his question:

"Und der *Schleier*?"

"Wie kamst du denn zu diesem *Schleier*, sprich?"

Later:

"Nimm diesen Ring und lasz den *Schleier* mir."

Johann: "Den *Schleier*?"

and later:

"Du nähmst das Leben mir mit diesem *Schleier*."

This word seems a kind of *Leitmotiv* for Agnes, and occurs altogether ten times.

In *Penthesilea* the chief characters are also in the demoniac grip of a single passion. It is *desire*, vaulting ambition, "Der Wunsch," that possesses Achilles and Penthesilea as a madness to their undoing. "Wunsch" is the ruling idea of the play. The Greek general says:

"Die sucht, ob nicht ein schmaler Pfad sich biete
Für einen *Wunsch* der keine Flügel hat."¹

Prothoe, one of the Amazons, to Penthesilea (p. 107):

"Um eines Sieges,
Der deine junge Seele flüchtig reizt,
Willst du das Spiel der Schlachten neu beginnen?
Weil unerfüllt ein *Wunsch*, ich weisz nicht welcher,
Dir im geheimen Herzen blieb."

The queen answers (p. 108):

"Sind's meine *Wünsche* blosz, die mich
Zurück auf's Feld der Schlachten rufen?"

Some scenes later, Penthesilea says (p. 122):

"Warum auch wie ein Kind gleich,
Weil sich ein flüchtiger *Wunsch* mir nicht gewährt,
Mit meinen Göttern brechen?"

Later Prothoe says to her (p. 126):

"Nicht ruhn wollt' ich, . . .
.
Bis meiner lieben Schwester *Wunsch* erfüllt."

¹ P. 97, Siegen's edition.

Toward the end of the drama, Meroe, another Amazon, says (p. 164):

“Sie zog dem Jüngling entgegen
In der Verwirrung ihrer jungen Sinne
Den *Wunsch*, den glühenden, ihn zu besitzen.”

This overmastering and unfulfilled desire is the fate of both Penthesilea and Achilles. It is not an external force, but the essence of their natures. It is the romantic psychological fate. The priestess, not understanding Penthesilea, says (p. 124):

“Unmöglich,
Das nichts von aussen sie, kein *Schicksal* hält,
Nichts als ihr thöricht Herz”

and Prothoe, Penthesilea's devoted friend, who understands her, answers:

“Das ist ihr *Schicksal*.”

It is as if Kleist had deliberately chosen this opportunity to hurl his interpretation of the powers ruling over life at the heads of convention and tradition symbolized by the priestess. Later Prothoe says to Penthesilea (p. 135):

“Welch ein *Geschick* auch über dich verhängt sei,
Wir tragen es, wir beide!”

Achilles says to her (p. 144):

“Vernichtend war das *Schicksal*, Königin,
Das deinem Frauenstaat das Leben gab.”

Later he says again (p. 153):

“Dein *Schicksal* ist auf ewig abgeschlossen.”

The herald brings Achilles' challenge to the queen with the words (p. 157):

“So fordert er
Noch einmal dich in's Feld hinaus, auf dasz
Das Schwert, des *Schicksals* ehr'ne Zung', entscheide.”

In *Die Hermannsschlacht* the word “Locke” is repeated to give force to the motivation of Thusnelda's inhuman plot against Ventidius, the Roman commander. Pretending to love her, he has asked her for a lock of hair. Later we learn that this request really was not prompted by sentiment, but by base vanity. His fate rests upon Thusnelda's state of mind on discovering his true

purpose. The word occurs sixteen times. The portrayal of Thusnelda's wrath is not without a concurrent brutality of race-feeling in Kleist himself, characterized by a frequent repetition of the word "Bärin."

The phrase "Fanfare blasen" occurs in an impressive manner in Kleist's *Prinz von Homburg*, its purpose being to emphasize Homburg's state of mind. One idea possesses him—the desire to win Natalie; he pursues it with somnambulistic concentration. He can win her only by distinguishing himself in an extraordinary manner, by a great decisive victory. This ambition speaks in the words "Fanfare blasen," which in Homburg's mind displace the whole careful plan of battle by which the complete destruction of the enemy is to be compassed.¹

Feldmarschall: "Dann wird er die *Fanfare blasen* lassen" (p. 24).
After a slight interruption by the other characters, the prince repeats:

"Dann wird er die *Fanfare blasen* lassen!" (p. 25).

The "Feldmarschall" is about to continue giving orders:

"Eh' wird er nicht *Fanfare blasen* lassen" (p. 26).

Rittmeister von Golz writes it down:

"Eh' wird er nicht *Fanfare blasen* lassen."

The "Feldmarschall" asks the Prince if *he* has written it down:

Prinz: "Von der *Fanfare*?"

Hohenzollern: *Fanfare!* Sei verwünscht! Nicht eh' als bis
der"

Later Homburg:

"Ja, allerdings! Eh' nicht.

Doch dann wird er *Fanfare blasen* lassen."

At the battle the prince gives orders for the attack before he receives word from the other divisions of the army: "*Lass Fanfare blasen!*" (p. 36), and, in spite of remonstrances from his friends, repeats, "Trompeter, *die Fanfare!*" (p. 37).

During his temporary hallucination the prince passes the open grave prepared to receive his body after his execution. The word "Grab" is repeated a number of times in order to emphasize the

¹ Edited by Nollen (Boston: Ginn & Co.).

part that associations aroused by it play in the psychological motivation. This part is clearly contained in this line:

“Seit ich mein *Grab* sah, will ich nichts als leben” (p. 72).

This is one of the cases in which the sound of a word concurs with its meaning in producing an effect of foreboding.

In Hebbel's dramas repetition for the purposes of psychological motivation is used in a similar manner as in Kleist. Hebbel, however, has some subtleties and dramatic effects all his own, corresponding to his peculiar conception of a barbaric eroticism—a monster half ape half god, in whose worship Romanticism and Naturalism have at all times met.

In *Judith* the word “Opfer” is used in a very interesting manner. Hebbel's purpose was to have it clearly understood that Judith, no matter how much she is fascinated by the primitive force of Holofernes, is not actuated by desire, even loathes the sweetness of the desire that threatens to overwhelm her a few times. The idea of sacrifice has to be emphasized throughout the play to overcome any suspicion in the spectator that, partly at least, Judith is seeking gratification rather than martyrdom. Therefore the word “Opfer” is thrust at us at the outset. Act I begins:

Holofernes: “*Opfer!*”

Oberpriester: “Welchem Gott?”

Holofernes: “Wem ward gestern *geopfert?*”

Holofernes: “Bringt das *Opfer* Einem, den ihr Alle kennt, und doch nicht kennt.”

Oberpriester: “Holofernes befiehlt, dass wir einem Gott *opfern* sollen,” etc.

At the end of the drama, when we know how great Judith's sacrifice has been, she rejects the offer of a reward with the words:

“Wenn das *Opfer* verröchelnd am Altar niederstürzt, quält ihr's mit der Frage, welchen Preis es auf sein Leben und Blut setzt? . . .”

However, the force of Holofernes, the barbaric superman, does play an important part in the conflict raging in Judith's mind, and to emphasize this also, the word “Kraft” occurs frequently, especially in the fifth act, just before the catastrophe. We are for a time in doubt whether Judith's determination can hold out

against the fascination of this force in Holofernes. The word also suggests the irony of fate in the situation of a strong man boasting of his security when the shadow of death is already upon him.

In *Golo und Genoveva*, Siegfried, Genoveva's husband, suffers from an obsession of distrust as mad and deadly as the characters in Kleist's *Familie Schrockenstein*. His suspicion is so deep-rooted and wilfully irrational that Golo says of him:

“Mein Widerruf bewirkte nichts,
Als dass er mir's nur um so fester glaubte.”

Repetition in *Golo und Genoveva* is overdone to such a degree that it is almost comical; as, for instance, “log” in Act IV, scene 6:

Golo: “Herr Graf, ich *log*.”

Siegfried: “Du *logst*? . . .

Doch gegen eine solche *Lüge* wär

Sie schuldlos . . .

Du *logst*!”

Golo: “Ich *log*.”

Siegfried: “. . . Um niemals zu erfahren, ob mein Weib

Die Sündlerin, ob du der *Lügner* warst,”

Margaretha: Brav! Eins—zwei—drei . . .

Ich *log*! zum dritten Mal! Nur fügt hinzu:

Ich *log* den andern Beiden nach. Verschweigt

Warum wir *logen*.

Ihr straft mich *Lügen*.

Nur zu! Ich *log*!

Two pages later, after Siegfried has become still more entangled in his madness of doubt,

Margaretha: “Ihr seid ein Mann,
Den Keiner zu *belügen* wagen wird. . . .”

Siegfried: . . .

Margaretha: “Doch ob sie etwa unerlaubt geküsst,
Es ist *erlogen* (zu Golo). Nichts für ungut, Herr,
Ihr könnt ja selbst *belogen* sein!”

The hero of the play is Golo. The dramatic purpose of it is to show how an erotic passion may not only lead a man into crime, but corrupt his will until he knowingly chooses a career of crime. Golo becomes in the end a deliberate criminal.

The last line in Act I reads:

Golo: “So leg'ich's aus, ich soll ein *Schurke* sein.”

Then in Act III, scene 10, after Genoveva has rejected his adulterous suit, putting him on his honor,

Golo: "Wer jetzt noch bleibt, der muss ein *Schurke* sein. Ich bin ein *Schurk'*. Nun hab ich *Schurkenrecht*, denn auch ein *Schurk'* hat Recht"

At the end of this speech he forcibly kisses Genoveva. In the following scene the word "Kuss" is repeated four times, referring to Golo's action, in order to emphasize the dramatic importance of it. This importance consists chiefly in the interpretation of the kiss by others, especially by Siegfried, the victim of his mad jealousy. To quote only two brief lines, in Act IV, scene 6:

Siegfried: "Ein *Kuss* auf ihre Hand?

Ich *küss* die Hand nicht wieder."

Another case of repetition in this drama is that of "Mord" and "nichts" together, as: "Ein Mord, ein Nichts," in Golo's speech of six lines concluding Act III. "Mord" occurs in this passage five times; "nichts" four times. The repetition serves the purpose of showing to what degree of evil and desperation Golo has fallen.

In *Maria Magdalena* the only word repeated is "nicht," or "nichts." It occurs in Act III, scene 2, in Klara's plea. The keynote of the whole speech is: "I demand nothing; I have nothing to live for now; only marry me to save me from shame and death." It confirms in us the anxious expectation that she will yield to the obvious suggestion of self-destruction arising from her conviction that her life is hopelessly bankrupt. The word "Gulden" repeated in Act I, scene 2, emphasizes a suspicion of Karl's character and is interesting. For this suspicion, though it later proves ungrounded, affects decisively the tragic course of events.

The tragic conflict in *Herodes und Mariamne* consists in the clash between the two principal characters. It is a tragedy of a conflict between the pride of a loyal and intensely passionate wife and a morbidly selfish, tyrannical husband. The tragic traits of Herod's character are emphasized in the repetition of the words "weiss" or "wissen," "Welt," "zittern;" those of Mariamne, in "zittern," and her final tragic determination in the word "Tod."

In Act I, scene 3, Herod has been called to Antonius to give an account of the assassination of Mariamne's brother. Mariamne has forgiven him the murder.

Herodes: "Ja! Antonius lässt mich rufen
 Doch, ob auch wiederkehren, *weiss* ich nicht!"
 Mariamne: "Du *weisst* es nicht?"
 Herodes: "Weil ich nicht *weiss* wie hart
 Mich meine—deine Mutter bei ihm verklagte."
 Herodes: "Gleichviel! Ich werd's erfahren. Eins nur muss ich
 Aus deinem Munde *wissen*, *wissen* muss ich
 Ob ich und wie ich mich vertheid'gen soll."
 Mariamne: "Ob du —."

In the ensuing dialogue Herod demands that Mariamne promise on oath to kill herself if he should not return, because he wishes to know whether she prefers him to the world ("die Welt," repeated four times in five lines). She refuses firmly, too proud to pledge herself to do what she is resolved to do of her free will. Herodes, thinking her love not great enough to give him the comfort of complete sympathy, says:

"Die Liebe *zittert* !
 Die *zittert* selbst in einer Heldenbrust!"
 Mariamne: "Die meine *zittert* nicht!"
 Herodes: "*Du zitterst* nicht" (accusing her of selfishness in opposing his
 "Du" to her "Die meine").

Mariamne leaves him, and in a monologue, scene 4, Herod says:

"Heut' nicht! Doch morgen, übermorgen! —
 Sie will mir nach dem Tode Gutes thun!
 Spricht so ein Weib? Zwar *weiss* ich's, dass sie oft,
 Wenn ich sie schön genannt, ihr Angesicht
 Verzog, bis sie es nicht mehr war. Auch *weiss* ich's,
 Dass sie nicht weinen kann, das Krämpfe ihr,
 Was ander'n Thränengüsse sind! Auch *weiss* ich's, . . . etc."

This insistence on entire certainty, in which Mariamne's integrity and honor are ignored, joined with the egoistical contrast between "the world" and himself, reveals the whole arrogant selfishness of Herod, incapable of faith in others, which, conflicting with Mariamne's passionate pride and love, brings about the catastrophe. Her pride is further emphasized by the word "räche"

in Act II, scene 3, occurring four times in three lines.¹ She would not seek revenge for the murder of her brother, but for a breach of the faith demanded and justified by her love and pride. Suspense arises from the inferences suggested by this incident, as to what she might be capable of doing should her pride be deeply hurt by Herod. Still other aspects of Mariamne's pride are contained in the repetitions of the words "schwur" (three times in the same scene), "Trost" (*ibid.*). The scene is between Mariamne and her mother who mourns for her murdered son, Aristobulos, and is much disappointed on finding that Mariamne is not in need of "consolation."

An extremely effective repetition occurs in Act IV, scene 8. Mariamne, having learned that Herod, on his second departure, has again given the command to have her killed in case he should lose his life during his hazardous enterprise, has come to the conclusion that he does not love her. In the frenzy of her desperation she arranges a great festivity for the time when the news of Herod's death is expected. She is dancing in a state of hysterical excitement when Herod suddenly appears. She addresses him:

Mariamne: "Der *Tod*! Der *Tod*! Der *Tod* ist unter uns!

Unangemeldet wie er immer kommt."

Salome [who desires Mariamne's death]: "Der *Tod*, für dich. Ja wohl!
So fühlst du selbst!"

Mariamne: "Zieh' das Schwert!

Reich mir den Giftpokal! Du bist der *Tod*!

Der *Tod* umarmt und küsst mit Schwert und Gift."

Salome [to Herod]: "Die Kerzen haben dich betrogen;
Hier wird gejubelt über deinen *Tod*."

This ominous word continues to recur throughout this scene, the last and climacteric one of the fourth act. Its chief purpose is psychological in two directions: principally, to symbolize Mariamne's determination to die, but also to confirm, partly through the insinuations of Salome, Herod's suspicions of Mariamne, which the latter is too proud, too bitterly determined, even to make an

¹ Edited by R. M. Werner (Berlin: B. Behr, 1901), p. 249. See also "Rache" repeated three times in three lines, earlier in the same scene, p. 243.

attempt of dispelling. It furthermore confronts the spectator blankly with the inevitable issue of the situation.

There are a great many repetitions in Hebbel's *Nibelungen*; but since they present no new type of repetition in psychological motivation, it may suffice here simply to name the chief words. They are: "Nebelkappe," "Gürtel" (ten times), "Eid," "Drachen" (Chriembild trying to influence Etzel), "Falke," "Schuh" (in the stone-throwing contest Siegfried outthrows his adversary always by one "Schuh"); and "liebte" (twice), "hasste," "Hass" (three times), "versöhnte," "Versöhnung" (five times), in close juxtaposition in Chriembild's "Rache."

In Grillparzer's dramas the most obvious case of repetition coming under this head occurs in *König Ottokar's Glück und Ende*. The word "knien" in various forms occurs at the end of Act III in line 614¹ twice; after that in IV, 69, 70, 71, 108, 110, 195, 196, 200, 479 (twice), 480. This word, repeated over and over again to Ottokar, or within his hearing, by his army, by the burgomaster and citizens of Prague, his subjects, and finally by his adulterous wife and Zawisch, her paramour, becomes an intolerable taunt, lashing him on to his now mad and hopeless revolt, to the brutal, lawless execution of Meerenberg, and to his final undoing. In a similar manner Sappho goads herself into fury by the repetition of the word "Undank": *Sappho*, IV, 18, 27, 30 (three times), 102, 108. Speaking the word the first time inadvertently in her plaint over Phaon's desertion, she is arrested, at the sound of it on her own lips, by the emotional possibilities of it, as it were. She fairly gloats over it in her self-abandonment to wrath, her rage gradually rising to a point where her actions, beginning with the determination to exile Melitta, take the tragic turn. In addition to this, the repetition forces upon us the inference that by putting her claim to Phaon's loyalty on the ground of gratitude she unconsciously acknowledges defeat.

To return to *Ottokar*, other cases of repetition are "feierlich" with "Gelübde" (I, 345, 347, 360, 557), emphasizing Ottokar's willingness to use any pretext to attain his ambitious ends; "O Hand von Schnee," etc. (II, 157, 158, 162, 165, 364, 561), mark-

¹ Lichtenheld's edition (Cotta).

ing the gradual acquiescence of the queen in Zawisch's suit, and generally foreshadowing the part she is to play; further Ottokar's repeating, "Die Schwäche macht versöhnlich" (III, 224, 229), showing that Ottokar's yielding is not prompted by a sense of right, but merely by momentary exhaustion, and suggesting that as soon as there is sufficient incentive again, he will return to his iniquitous ways.

In *Ein Bruderkzwist in Österreich* the word "Spiel" is significant. In Act III Rudolph, speaking of Matthias, says:

"Mein Bruder ist nicht schlimm, obgleich nicht klug,
Ich geb' ihm *Spielraum*, er begehrt zu *spielen*."

Julius replies:

"War's *Spiel*, dass eigner Macht er schloss den Frieden?"
"Ist's *Spiel*, dass er den Herren *spielt* im Land?"

Rudolph: "Du *spielst* mit Worten, wie er mit der Macht."

And again, p. 107,¹ "*Heldenspiel*." This word, accounting as it does for the most significant weakness, lack of stability, in Matthias (and also, though in a different manner, in the other, actual or possible, pretenders to the throne of Austria), foreshadows the disastrous part he is to take in the affairs of a country that needs firmness and sober persistency in its ruler more than any other quality. The triviality and irrelevancy of the Hapsburgians is further brought to our notice in the repetitions of the word "Kreis" ("im Kreise drehen") on pp. 43 (twice), 44, 64 l. i.²

Three distinct ideas are interwoven to form the tragic complication of *Das Goldene Vliess*. They are the traditional fate attached to the thirst for gold, symbolized in the fleece laden with an accumulating weight of curses. This idea influences the external action directly, requiring external motivation. It is emphasized chiefly by the repetitions of the words "Vliess" and "Fluch." The other two ideas are the relations between civilization and barbarism, and the purely personal conflict between Jason and Medea. Of these the former, though it appears as a psychological conflict, will be discussed later,³ because the interest attaching to it primarily involves a much broader general question, the

¹ Cotta edition.

² Edited by August Sauer (Cotta).

³ Under the head of "Dramas with a Purpose."

psychological conflict being merely one of its reflexes. But the personal relations between Jason and Medea are purely and ultimately psychological. Medea, in pouring out her bitterness to Kreusa, characterizes Jason thus, repeating the same words ten lines farther on: "Du kennst ihn nicht, ich aber kenn ihn ganz." This line, framing, as it were, through repetition her indictment of Jason, gives a weight to it for the attention of the spectator, which pursues him, compelling him to apply her interpretation of Jason's motives to his acts, note his deterioration step by step, and draw inferences as to the probable direction of his course.

Otto Ludwig uses repetition very extensively. The most emphatic cases of it will be treated under a different head. There are, however, some very good ones in *Die Makkabäer*¹ which belong here. The leading idea in this play is that Judah is chosen by the Lord to restore the historic splendor of the house of Israel. The faith of the people in the chosen of the Lord, actuating all the chief characters, including Judah himself, becomes the fundamental psychological motive of the play. It is emphasized by a repetition of the word "Judah." This name occurs throughout the play with greater frequency than would be required by ordinary speech; e. g., seven times on p. 176. This extraordinary repetition produces in us the feeling that the salvation of the whole people depends upon this one man. We gradually associate a growing sense of a superhuman prominence and power with Judah. This feeling is enhanced by these repetitions: "Gross" (Act I, pp. 174, 175; four times); "Mann" (I, 174, 175; five times); and again in the same association (I, 187; four times); "Krone David" (emphasizing the historical mission of Israel; I, 179; four times; including "Königskrone," once). Associated with this within sixteen lines: "Kranz," in "Kranz die Krone" (twice); and "Hut," "Hohenpriesterhut," "Aaron's Hut" (four times). "Hut" and "Krone" often recur later in the same scene; "Volk," "Retter," "Retter-Volk," together (I, 183; twice); "Volk" alone frequently; "Krone" again in the same association, later in I, 188 (four times); "will's" ("Der Herr will's") (II, 201, 203; thirteen times). Minor repetitions are: "Tempel" (II, 196; five times),

¹ Edited by Adolph Bartels (Leipzig: Max Hesse).

emphasizing the religious nature of the struggle; "Freundschaft" (three times), "fluchen" ("eignem Kinde," twice) (five times), emphasizing the pre-eminent and irreconcilable character of the conflict.

Of the repetitions in Wagner the following belong here: "Fürchten," in *Siegfried* (about twenty-five times), foreshadowing Siegfried's careless and ingenuous nature which ultimately causes his death; "verthan" and "versungen," in *Die Meistersinger*, to characterize the weight of philistinism in the mastersingers with which Walther's free spontaneity has to contend.

REPETITION PER SE

There are a number of cases where psychological motivation is achieved, not by the meaning nor by the sound of the word, but principally by the mere fact that a person repeats the same word. Such a repetition, whether in the form of quick iteration, or interrupted by varying intervals of silence or of other words or events, indicates a certain emotional state of the speaker, or reveals a certain emotional effect produced by another person, thus interpreting also the latter's conduct; or it induces an emotional reaction in the person in whose presence the repetition occurs. The range of emotions that can be expressed by such repetition and the reactions caused by it is unlimited. It reaches below and above the normal, including, to give a few instances, joy, hate, terror, enthusiasm, love, passion, impatience, concern of any kind; disappointment, dejection, melancholy, despair, desperation, malice, stubbornness, and so forth. In Kleist's *Familie Schrockenstein*, Jeronimus, related to both the hostile houses, goes to Rupert on an errand of reconciliation. At this time the herald sent by Rupert to Sylvester to declare a war of extermination has been slain by the mob assembled before Sylvester's palace. The news of the deed has aroused all the evil passions in Rupert. He receives Jeronimus with these words (Act III, scene 2):

". . . Vielleicht hast du
Auftrag' an mich, kommst im Geschäft des Friedens,
Stellst selbst vielleicht die heilige Person
Des *Herolds* dar?—"

Jeronimus: "Des *Herolds* ?—Nein. Warum ?
Die Frag' ist seltsam."

During the progress of this scene Rupert gives way to an almost satanic hatred of his adversaries. Toward the end, with ominous emphasis, he says:

"Was ist ein *Herold* ?"
Jeronimus: "Du bist entsetzlich —"
Rupert: "Bist du denn ein *Herold* ?"
Jeronimus: "Dein Gast bin ich, ich wiederhol's und wenn
Der *Herold* dir nicht heilig ist, so wird's
Der Gast dir sein."

We see the murderous plan soon to be executed forming in Rupert's hate-ridden mind. The word is repeated frequently afterward: pp. 59 (twice), 64 (twice), 66, 67 (twice), 76; but in these later cases it is not so much the repetition as the meaning of the word which produces the intended effect of showing the extent of Rupert's malice in this violation of one of the most sacred laws of war.

In Otto Ludwig's *Erbförster* the word "durchforsten" is used in a similar way. The disastrous quarrel between the forester and Stein arises over the question of thinning out (*durchforsten*) a certain forest. The repetition of "durchforsten" (about twenty times) in Act I, scene 1 (pp. 102 ff., 111-28), which is peculiarly insistent, marks, and intensifies as well, the obstinacy of the two men. This effect is reinforced, with reference to the forester, by his manner of repeating the word "Herr" three times on p. 103, and again three times on the following page, where it has a different meaning, yet essentially the same dramatic effect. These repetitions are supported by a number of others which, on account of their organic connection, are quoted here rather than under the preceding head, where they belong: "Vom Vater zum Grossvater," p. 130, p. 133 (five times); "Recht" p. 130 (six times in a short passage, harking back to: "Aber der Herr hat doch allemal *recht*, weil er der Herr ist" p. 103); and again, p. 165, three times, and in other places throughout the play; "Bauernmoral," p. 117 (four times; "redlich," p. 117 (four times); "wenn und aber," pp. 133, 134, 165, 171, 172. The psychological condition from which the

disastrous course of events takes its rise is an obsession of a similarly blind force as in Kleist's *Familie Schroffenstein*. The old "Förster," whose father and grandfather have had his position before him, regards it as his right and duty (opposed to the egoistical "Bauernmoral") to impose his will regarding the conduct of his office even upon his employer. He declines to reason about the matter, to consider the "wenn und aber," insisting on nursing his feeling of resentment over his discharge which is the result of his quarrel with his master. He feels himself a victim merely of a brute force residing in an order of things which he symbolizes by an invidious repetition of the word "Herr."

The extravagant use of repetition in this play comports well with the subject of it, which is a purely emotional condition. At the root of the disaster is temper. Repetition here combines the two functions of being a consistent form of expression on the part of the "Förster," and of conveying to the audience a sense of his extraordinary mental condition and the fatal external consequences likely to spring from it.

In Grillparzer's *Medea* occurs a case of repetition revealing, not a state of mind in the speaker, but in the person addressed, and arousing an important partisan reaction in the sympathies of the spectator. *Medea*, trying to please Jason, has learned a song. She has to repeat the words, "Ich weiss ein Lied," a number of times before Jason, absorbed in his interest in Kreusa, takes cognizance of her (*Medea*, II, 281, 292, 295).¹

IV. PLAYS WITH A PURPOSE ("TENDENZ")

The point of view thus far taken in analyzing the dramatic action has been that of causality. The only relations between the parts and the dramatic whole considered have been those of actual fact, establishing a plausible consistency, either of external sequences of events, or of internal, psychological processes. The only faculty appealed to in the spectator has been assumed to be that of sane and critical inferences from external evidence or psychological data. But in judging a serious drama another faculty comes into play—the faculty of appreciation, or judgment

¹ Edited by A. Lichtenheld (Cotta).

of values. These values may be either ethical or aesthetic. Both of these will have to be treated under separate heads.

1. *The ethical values of a drama.*—There is a school of writers and critics who demand that no appreciation of ethical values is to enter into the judgment of art and literature. They would rest content with a presentation of a plausible sequence of events, external or psychological, disregarding their ethical values estimated in terms of individual, social, generally human, historical interests. (Whether these interests are ultimately to be accounted for by utility, or absolute ideal validity, or a compromise between the two, does not matter here.) But it is evident, and has always been the result worked out by the intellectual activity of the different eras of literary and cultural thought, that the more comprehensive, the more complete, the more universal the range of human interests embodied in works of literature is, the more intense, potent, and enduring is their appeal. No dramatic action and no psychological problem or conflict have vital significance for the world unless they have far and deep-reaching ethical bearings. Supreme art is impossible, no matter how clever it is, without supreme ethical significance. This significance, or value, of a drama is therefore one of the two fundamental criteria of excellence and power, the other being that of intrinsic consistency, already considered. Neither can take the place of the other. No ethical purpose, however high, can uphold a drama lacking dramatic consistency, any more than a building badly constructed will resist ruin because it is dedicated to some high service. Nor can supreme skill expended on flimsy and perishable material give enduring value to it. Perfect harmony between construction and ethical value produces perfect art.

In the supreme drama the moral values residing in the dramatic data, and adding substance to the objects of our suspense, form an integral part of the structure and organism of the drama, and particularly of motivation, so completely that analysis of the one necessarily covers the other also. But in the great majority of serious dramas the purpose exceeds the structural capacity. They are the so-called dramas-with-a-purpose. In these the ordinary methods of motivation are thwarted and diverted by an extraneous

guiding idea. For, the ethical purpose being dominant in the poet's mind, the sequence of events or the psychological processes cannot be the ultimate goal of his motivation. They are merely helps, intermediate supports, enabling him to reach his final aim. No matter, therefore, how great a share of our attention is absorbed by the interest of story—external motivation—or the psychological interest—internal motivation—our expectancy is not directed primarily toward these, but toward the dramatist's final attainment of his purpose toward which they are devised to lead. These dramas, which are called didactic or allegorical or symbolistic or problematic according to the literary methods followed in their composition, form a mixed class, partly overlapping the other two classes. It is hardly necessary to point out that among those influenced by Romanticism the dramas of purpose as a rule intersect the class characterized by psychological motivation.

The question may be asked how an ethical purpose can produce dramatic suspense. In a drama of this class we are always dimly conscious and morally certain that the dramatist is prepared to lead the action to his purpose, whether his theme or characters will or no. We feel that we have fallen in with a personally conducted party. All the routes and stopping-places have been arranged before the start; all lateral avenues of disconcerting spontaneity have been closed and sealed. Every little glimpse of the poet's intention will therefore bring our speculations within closer range of the dominant interest embodied in the drama, and thus intensify our suspense.

In none of the cases under consideration has the purpose been put on an absolute philosophical ground, for the good reason that a dramatist of any insight could not assume such a ground in an existence without absolute values and with all its ideals indissolubly bound up with pragmatic interests. It is always found to rest upon a lower ground, where the ethical interest is more or less mixed with a personal and passionate one, with a more or less prejudiced preference, as patriotism, race-prejudice, religious or any other kind of partisanship, affinity with certain types of character and temperament, and so forth. Considered from the point of view of the ideal, of a universal art these personal preferences

might seem, and some of them undoubtedly are, in a measure corrupt. As regards the national interest, however, it is certain, and has been emphasized in modern times since Herder by every competent writer on the subject, that all supreme dramatic art has had its root in the national life in which it flourished, and has therefore never been quite without patriotic or racial, and even chauvinistic, bias. Respect and sympathy cannot be withheld even from the idiosyncrasies engendered by a warm-hearted, full-blooded participation in the potent influences surrounding us at every step we take.

Schiller in *Wilhelm Tell* appealed to the patriotic interest of his German contemporaries, trying to teach them, through the example of the Swiss republicans, the needed lesson of national unity. The repetition of the word "ein" ("einig") throughout the play, culminating in Attinghausen's dying words (IV, 2, 2452), "Seid einig, einig, einig," had a powerful effect upon the Germans of those days of disunion and weakness. But nowadays, political union having been accomplished and patriotic passion satisfied, cooler consideration divests the word of a potency not genuine, because not sufficiently related to the fundamental structure of the play.

Lessing's *Nathan der Weise* presents an example of an extreme reaction against the religious intolerance of his time, prompting him to give an unfair representation to the Christian, as opposed to the Jewish and Mohammedan religions. In I, 5, "gehorschen" and "meint der Patriarch" are often repeated to show the abjectness of the monk and to dispose us unfavorably toward the representatives of Christianity. The same purpose is served by the repetitions of "Rat," "Scheiterhaufen," "Holzstoss," "ein Problema," and especially the words recurring very often: "Thut nichts, der Jude wird verbrannt," emphasizing the cold-blooded cruelty of the Christians. The repetition of "Jude," "ganz gemeiner Jude," by Al-Hafi to protect Nathan, serves to characterize the Christians unfavorably and the Mohammedan favorably.

In *Prinz von Homburg* Kleist made an attempt to rid the prince of the arbitrary individualism characteristic of his own and his Romantic contemporaries' more youthful view of life, and of the

heroes of his earlier dramas, by making him bow to the authority of law. The issue of the play depends upon the interpretation of certain parts of martial law. The word "Gesetz" is significantly repeated toward the end of the drama (about six times, pp. 105, 106, 113, 115, Nollen ed.).

A very important case of purpose emphasized by repetition occurs in Hebbel's *Agnes Bernauer*. Albrecht, son and heir of Ernst, duke of Bavaria, has married Agnes, the daughter of a burgher of Augsburg. The nobles and estates of the duchy are incensed over the mésalliance, and the duchy is brought to the brink of a revolution. When neither Albrecht nor Agnes proves amenable to his urgent request to save the country by dissolving their union, Duke Ernst has Agnes abducted and, after the formality of a trial, put to death for high treason. Albrecht collects an army, defeating his father's forces. Ernst himself is taken prisoner. The tragic conflict is between the *raison d'état* and personal loyalty to the beloved wife, between the duties of Albrecht as an individual and as a citizen, the most important citizen, of the state. When Albrecht learns that his father, the duke, has been captured, he, who has been killing whomever of his father's chief followers he could overtake, commands (V, 8, pp. 82, 83):

"[Man] soll ihn freilassen! *Gleich!*"

Nothhaft von Wernberg: "Ei, das kommt wohl morgen auch früh genug!"

Albrecht: "*Gleich!* sage ich. Mensch, fühlst du's denn nicht auch?"

Nothhaft von Wernberg: "Eh' er Urfehde geschworen hat und uns wenigstens die Köpfe gesichert hat?"

Albrecht (stampft mit dem Fuss): "*Gleich! Gleich! Gleich!*"

This sudden halt in the midst of his headlong career of revenge, jeopardizing the lives of himself and his faithful followers, brings home to us his abiding respect for law and order, symbolized by the person of the ruler. It prepares us for the turn in the course of the dramatic action. This effect is further intensified by the repetition of the words "Göttliche und menschliche Ordnung" (V, 9) and "Gewalt" (p. 84):

Ernst [to Albrecht]: ". . . Aber wenn du dich wider *göttliche und menschliche Ordnung* empörst . . . "

Albrecht: "*Göttliche und menschliche Ordnung!* Ha, ha! Als ob's zwei Regenbogen wären, die man zusammengefügt und als funkelnden Zauberring um die Welt gelegt hätte! Aber die *göttliche Ordnung* rief sie in's Leben Die *menschliche* (er tritt Ernst näher) die *menschliche* !"

And in the next scene (V, 10, p. 86) the imperial herald, in pronouncing the ban of the empire over him, again repeats: "in deinem Trotz wider *menschliche und göttliche Ordnung* " Another repetition referring to the purpose of the drama is that of "Gewalt" (V, 10, p. 87):

Albrecht: "Soll ich mich vor der *Gewalt* demüthigen ?"

Ernst: "Gewalt? Wenn das *Gewalt* ist, was du erleidest, so ist eine *Gewalt*, die alle deine Väter dir anthun, eine *Gewalt*, die sie selbst sich aufgeladen, und ein halbes Jahrtausend lang ohne Murren ertragen haben und das ist die *Gewalt* des Rechts! "

This example may suffice for Hebbel. But before passing on it is necessary to point out that of all the dramatists of a higher order he is the one most persistent and immoderate in attempting, by way of a false (a "faked") background, to extend the reach of the central ideas of his plays far beyond their intrinsic structural validity, and that he more than others offers examples of words repeated to emphasize his special purpose.¹

The most numerous cases in Grillparzer's dramas are found in *Libussa*. The fundamental conflict in the play is between two theories of government: the old patriarchal one, deriving the authority of the ruling class from a mystical unity with the cosmic order of things, and exacting from the subject classes a childlike confidence and reverence; and the ideal of modern constitutional liberalism, basing the distribution of authority on a definite Declaration of Rights. Secondary conflicts are those between feministic and reactionary ideals of an absolute right to be enforced without compromise by a mere appeal to the sense of justice of the governed, on the one hand, and a practical, determined, persistent method, preferring for the time being a possible, partial good to an impossible whole, on the other; and finally between obsolete privilege and modern democratic equality. The

¹ As, for instance, the continuous cursing of the Jew in *Golo und Genoveva*, II, 5; the allusions to Christ and the Slaughter of the Innocents in *Herodes*, and so forth.

mystical union between life and the cosmic forces, between traditional authority and the natural needs of men, is symbolized by "Kleinod," "Gürtel," "Kette," "Gold" (opposed to "eisern," cf. the legend of the Golden Age), "Krone," and by the opposition of "Bauer" and "Fürst," all repeated throughout the play. The aversion of "Libussa" (and Grillparzer) to constitutional liberalism is emphasized through the very insistent repetition of the word "Recht," as, for instance, pp. 121,¹ 157, 158, 180 ("Gerechtigkeit," "gerecht," "Unrecht"), 186 ("Recht," "Unrecht"), etc.² But the most significant word is "Mann," often opposed to "Frau," because man—the modern, liberal man—stands at the center of the whole purpose of *Libussa*; see, for instance, p. 160 (three times); p. 161 (four times, reinforced by repetition of "eisern," "Eisen"); p. 163 (three times, and opposed to "Frau" and "Weib"); p. 164 (three times); p. 174 (three times); and so forth.

In *Medea* the well-ordered, ample simplicity of civilization is opposed to the disarranged narrow complexity of barbaric minds in these words spoken by both Kreusa and Medea: Medea (I, p. 86), "Ein einfach' Herz," and Kreusa (III, 247), "Ein einfach' Herz und einen reinen Sinn."

2. *The aesthetic interest.*—Every drama appeals to a certain extent, and to an extent increasing in proportion to the culture of the audience, to the literary sensibilities of the latter. This interest, often called sophisticated, is within certain limits thoroughly legitimate. It is only the naturalists and literalists, demanding the highest degree of "imitation of nature," of "illusion" attainable, who ignore the obvious fact that art means no more than representation only to crude and rudimentary forms of aesthetic intelligence; whereas to artists, and to those who have entered into its spirit, it means presentation, at first hand, of conceptions none of which ever existed or can exist in nature except in inchoate and rudimentary forms, and in confusing and hopelessly jumbled conglomerations, stimulating, teasing, and feeding the artistic intellect, but not satisfying it until they are selected

¹ Edited by August Sauer (Cotta).

² Cf. *Ein Bruderzwist in Österreich*, pp. 66, 100, and elsewhere. This play appears in many ways as a preparation for *Libussa*.

and transformed in accordance with what somehow we know to be the fundamental canons of art. To suppose that a crude and naïve mind, because it can recognize certain realistic landmarks in the background of a drama, or certain realistic traits in the characters, or the actuality of the facts and events represented, can form a truer judgment of the merits of a drama than a person more deeply cultured and more conscious of himself—provided he has not dulled his spontaneity nor corrupted his originality by overburdening his memory—means merely making a virtue of ignorance and dulness. It is like conditioning the eligibility of jurors in an important criminal case upon a stupidity and indolence sufficient to maintain and protect a state of complete ignorance concerning facts of general repute, and current interpretations of that and similar cases.

Art cannot exist without considerable conventions, though it must be without makeshift truths and ideals. But it is obviously absurd to suppose that the artistic reality of a work of art is diminished by the fact that the audience or spectators are conscious of its being artistic.

The aesthetic interest is that of the critic and cultured person concerned with the artistic—i. e., constructive—purposes of the dramatist. The subject of it is not the question of how the action is to proceed, but why the dramatist made it proceed as he did. That this interest must produce a certain suspense is obvious; though it must be admitted that, being less primitive, less concerned with the foundation needs of life, it is far less potent than in the previous cases. There is no drama in which this interest does not propose questions to the thoughtful spectator. In Grillparzer's *Medea*, in the scene between Medea and Kreusa ending in the quarrel and the breaking of the lyre, we cannot help comparing our opinions thus far formed concerning the logic of Medea's and Kreusa's characters with the applications of it made or promised by the dramatist's control of the action. We cannot, for instance, help weighing Medea's words: "Du kennst ihn nicht, ich aber kenn ihn ganz," and her state of mind bespoken by them as well as their effect upon Kreusa, and trying to ascertain how far our conclusions agree with the poet's, and, in

case of disagreement, to what extent we still would find the dramatist's solution of his problem acceptable and capable of engaging our serious attention. Or in Kleist's *Homburg*, one of our perfectly legitimate, though called sophisticated, interests in the prince's character would prompt a desire to anticipate, as soon and as accurately as possible, how and why the poet would manage a rehabilitation of the prince without violating the intrinsic probabilities of the situation. It is through this interest alone that we attempt to enter the sanctum, that we try to participate, at least by reflection, by *Anempfindung*, in the creative labor of the poet's mind. The acknowledgment of the legitimacy of this interest opens a deep, varied, and fascinating vista of a subject not even touched by students of the drama—the subject of the deliberate, conscious communication from poet to audience, his dramaturgic flirtations, so to speak, with the spectators.

Among the modern German dramatists it is especially Grillparzer who resorts to such a variety of clever and subtle artifices in order to project his shy, and yet intense and pointed, appeals to his audiences beyond the direct and literal scope of the language of his dramas that one is tempted at times to analyze his motivation chiefly from this point of view. To be sure, in the highest, the world-art, this personal element is supposed to be drowned entirely in a deep flood of objectivity, but do we not, now and then, find even Shakespeare himself engagingly wigwagging to us across the tempests and the gay splendor of his plays?¹

Before concluding, a few words should be said regarding the use of repetition in the contemporary drama. Without going into detail, it should be pointed out that, owing to the Romantic character of the contemporary drama, including, as shown above, the naturalistic drama, the technical use of the repetition of a keyword has remained essentially unchanged. Two examples may suffice: one from the first and most extreme drama of Naturalism, to wit, the drunken shouts of the old peasant in Hauptmann's *Vor Sonnenaufgang*, pointing to the catastrophe; and the other from one of the subtlest modern psychological

¹For instance, in the monologue on the stage in *Hamlet*, or Theseus' speech about lunatics, lovers, and poets at the beginning of the fifth act of *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.

dramas, the word "Liebe" in Sudermann's *Johannes*, repeated more than a score of times for the purpose of psychological motivation and development.

There is one new form of repetition found in the dramas of Maeterlinck, which, though not strictly belonging to the subject, yet, both because Maeterlinck is deeply influenced by German Romanticism and because he in his turn is influencing the modern German drama, should find brief mention. It is the reiteration of words and phrases by those of his characters representing simple folk and children. This repetition expresses a gaucherie, a fate-ridden helplessness and resignation, such as are found among the poor and lowly, whom the march of history has passed by. The modern reactionary Romanticists—W. B. Yeats, for instance—are fond of these folk and their often very engaging, though ineffectual, wisdom, and have endeavored to make them available for the modern drama. Maeterlinck, by a stroke of genius, seems to have selected precisely the kind of words and phrases most fitted for this neo-Romantic individualization.

SUMMARY

It is generally supposed that Romanticism, being essentially lyrical, contributed nothing to the development of the drama. The main result of this study may be interpreted as an addition to our understanding of the very essential dramatic services of Romanticism. The psychological subtlety, wealth, and depth of the modern drama would have been impossible except through the extension of our knowledge of the passional side of our mental processes which we owe to Romantic emotionalism. This extension went on in two directions, giving force and variety to the relations between the characters of the play—i. e., developing psychological motivation—on the one hand, and fundamentally changing those of the audience to the play, on the other. Romanticism taught the dramatist how to offer his audience a deeper and more poignant satisfaction than his less emotional predecessors. The subjects of the latter could be resolved, in their more trivial forms, into a tale, or into a riddle or puzzle, a mere sop to curiosity, surrendered to a shallow appetite by the

device of the dénouement; or, in their more dignified form, into the inevitable issue of the course of an external fate. The Romantic dramatist, however, perceived that the emotional nature of his audience demanded stronger fare; that there was before him a collective being abounding in a surprising passional capacity, and clamoring for an opportunity to expend some of his emotional energy. The only opportunity of this kind in the dramatic spectator could be that of passionate participation in the dramatic action, of an intense self-identification with the dramatic characters. This the Romantic dramatist set out to accomplish, aiming at a sort of magic, a mesmeric obsession of the minds of his audience. And one of his principal means of imposing, intensifying, driving home this obsession was the tireless, recurrent keyword.

The Romanticists went to an extreme at first, and many of them never returned to moderation, believing that this sympathetic, or magnetic, or hypnotic—i. e., the immediate emotional—effect of their dramas took the place of all the more quiet, sober, universal verities on which a work of art must be based in order to be enduring. Historical development, as always, soon drew the true balance, showing that a passionate personal interest of the audience in the action of a drama, while it cannot take the place of the more objective parts of poetic truth, is yet a fundamental and integral part of the constructive conception of the modern drama, adding force and a greatly intensified sense of passional reality and intimacy to the dramatic action.

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